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FRAMING THE ISSUES
Malvina Halberstam*
Several months ago, it struck me that there is something in the
news about the holocaust almost daily—a trial in France; docu
ments shredded in Switzerland; a cache of what is believed to be
looted Nazi gold found in Brazil; hearings held by a Congressional
Committee; a report issued by the State Department—raising new
issues and reviving old ones. I decided to organize this symposium
in order to examine some of these issues from a historical, legal,
and moral perspective.
In May 1997 the United States government issued a report on
U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other As
sets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II ("Eizenstat Report").^ It was prepared by William Z. Slany, the Historian
of the State Department, with the participation of the Central In
telligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of State,
the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investiga
tion, the Federal Reserve Board, the National Archives and Rec
ords Administration, the National Security Agency, and the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is over 200 pages long. In the
process of compiling the report, more than 800,000 pages of docu
ments were declassified.
In his forward to the Report, Under Secretary of Commerce
for International Trade Stuart Eizenstat, who coordinated it,
states:
The report documents one of the greatest thefts by a govern
ment in history: the confiscation by Nazi Germany of an esti
mated $580 million of central bank gold
These goods were
stolen from governments and civilians ..., including Jews mur
dered in extermination camps, from whom everything was
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. These
remarks were made at the opening of the symposium on The Holocaust, Moral and Legal
Issues Unresolved Fifty Years Later, held at the Cardozo School of Law in New York on
February 8-9,1998.

1 WILLIAM SLANY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER
AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING
WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY (1997).
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taken, down to the gold fillings of their teeth.
This is a report by historians. It is a search for facts from the
past.^
Its major conclusions are:
First, the massive and systematic plundering of gold and
other assets... was essential to the financing of the German
war machine. The Reichsbank—the central bank of the Ger
man state—^was a knowing and integral participant.... It was
the Reichsbank that assisted in converting victim gold coins,
jewelry and gold fillings into assets for the SS "Melner" ac
count. ...
. . . Between January 1939 and June 30, 1945, Germany
transferred gold worth around... $3.9 billion in today's val
ues ... to the Swiss National Bank in Bern
Second, in the unique circumstances of World War II, neu
trality collided with morality; too often being neutral provided a
pretext for avoiding moral considerations.^
Mr. Eizenstat notes:
Of course, we must be cautious in making simplistic moral
judgements about the conduct of neutral nations in wartime.
None of these nations started World War II or caused the
Holocaust; that responsibility rested squarely with Nazi Ger
many. No country, including the United States, did as much as
it might have or should have to save innocent victims of Nazi
persecution—Jews, Gypsies, political opponents, and others.
America itself remained a non-belligerent for over two years
following the outbreak of the War in Europe. Restrictive U.S.
immigration policies kept hundreds of thousands of refugees
from finding safety in the United States, most tragically exem
plified by our refusal to allow the St. Louis to dock with its
cargo of refugees—many of whom perished when the ship was
forced to return to Europe. Nevertheless, the U.S. froze Ger
man assets in April 1940 (18 months before entering the War),
conducted little trade and commerce with Nazi Germany, and
generously assisted Britain, the Soviet Union and the anti-Nazi
cause—despite fierce domestic opposition—through programs
like Lend-Lease.
Many of the neutrals had a rational fear that their own in
dependence was only a Panzer division away from extinction.

2 Id. at iii.
3 Id. at iv-v.
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But if self-defense and fear were factors in that rationale for
neutrality, so too were profit in all neutral countries and out
right Nazi sympathy in some. The neutrals ignored repeated
Allied entreaties to end their dealings with Nazi Germany.
Whatever their motivation, the fact that they pursued vigorous
trade with the Third Reich had the clear effect of supporting
and prolonging Nazi Germany's capacity to wage war.
To varying degrees, each of the neutrals cooperated with
Nazi Germany for their own economic benefit. Sweden was
one of Nazi Germany's largest trading partners, supplying cntically-needed iron ore and ball bearings, among other goods.
Portugal suppUed a variety of vital mineral resources for the
Third Reich's war machine, including the ore for tungsten, a
key additive used in the production of weapon-grade steel.
Spain maintained an active trade in goods and raw materials.
Turkey was Germany's source of very scarce chrome. Argen
tina's pro-Axis regime failed to control the transfer of German
funds from Europe."
The Report continues:
Third, of all the neutral nations, the one with the most
complex roles in World War II, together with the deepest and
most crucial economic relationship with Nazi Germany, was
Switzerland. Switzerland's role was very mixed. It ended World
War II as one of the wealthiest nations in Europe. It coriducted
trade with the Allied countries as well as with the Axis pow
ers. ... Switzerland persuaded the Nazis to establish the J
stamp which prevented tens of thousands of Jews from entering
Switzerland or other potential sanctuaries. Like Canada and
the United States, Switzerland tightened its immigration poli
cies, and during the War it virtually closed its borders to Jews
fleeing deportation from France and Belgium. As mariy as
about 50,000 Jewish refugees were admitted from 1933 until the
end of the War, of whom some 30,000 remained and survived
the War in Switzerland.'
Mr Eizenstat also states: "As late as the end of 1944, Secre
tary of State Stettinius and his State Department colleagues con
cluded that, on balance, Switzerland's neutrality had been more a
positive than a negative for the Allies during the War."® However,
he continues:

* Id. at v-vi.
5 Id. at vi.
6 Id.
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This relatively benign judgment was not shared by other agen
cies, from the War Department and Treasury Department to
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Justice Depart
ment. These agencies noted that in addition to its critical
banking role for the Nazis, Switzerland's industries engaged in
direct production for the Axis and helped protect Axis invest
ments; Swiss shipping lines also furnished Germany with a large
number of boats for the transport of goods. Switzerland also
allowed an unprecedented use of its railways to link Germany
and Italy for the transport of coal and other goods. Switzerland
provided Germany with arms, ammunition, aluminum, machin
ery and precision tools, as well as agricultural products. Swiss
convoys carried products from Spain across France through
Switzerland to Germany. Swiss banks serviced Nazi markets in
Latin America. This conduct continued even as the Germans
retreated and the threat of invasion evaporated. As late in the
War as early 1945, Switzerland vitiated an agreement it had just
reached with the United States to freeze German assets and to
restrict purchases of gold from Germany.
Switzerland's "business as usual" attitude persisted in the
postwar negotiations, and it is this period which is most inexpli
cable. The Swiss team were obdurate negotiators, using legalis
tic positions to defend their every interest, regardless of the
moral issues also at stake. Initially, for instance, they opposed
returning any Nazi gold to those from whom it was stolen, and
they denied having received any looted gold. The Swiss con
tended they had purchased it in good faith, that it was part of
war booty obtained in accordance with international legal prin
ciples by the Third Reich during its victorious campaigns, and
that there was no International legal principle which would en
title the Allies to recover and redistribute Nazi assets. Finally,
after long, contentious and difficult bargaining, agreement was
reached in the form of the 1946 Allied-Swiss Washington Ac
cord. The Accord obligated Switzerland to transfer 250 million
Swiss francs ($58.1 million) in gold to the Allies and to liquidate
German assets—transferring 50 percent of the proceeds from
the assets to the Allies for the reconstruction of war-torn
Emope, of which a portion would be directed to assistance of
stateless victims. At the same time, the Swiss made a commit
ment in a side letter to identify dormant accounts which were
heirless and could be used for the benefit of Nazi victims.
The $58 million in German-looted gold to be returned to
the Allies was far less than the range of $185-$289 million in
looted gold ... at the Swiss National Bank
This $58 million
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in monetary gold was promptly paid to the Tripartite Gold
Commission (TGC) for redistribution to the claimant countries.
But the other part of the Accord, the liquidation of hun
dreds of millions of dollars in German assets, was neither
promptly nor ever fully implemented
U.S. negotiators con
cluded by 1950 that the Swiss had no intention of ever imple
menting the 1946 Washington Accord
. . . Finally, in 1952, after a lengthy and frustrating effort,
Switzerland and the Allies agreed to a total payment of only
$28 million—far less than the agreed 50 percent of the value of
German assets in their country.'
The summary of the report by Mr. Slany states:
Germany's war effort depended significantly upon its im
ports of raw materials and goods from the neutral nations.
Switzerland was Nazi Germany's banker and financial facilita
tor, taking and transferring German gold—most of it looted—
and providing Germany with Swiss francs to purchase needed
products. Switzerland also supplied Germany with key war ma
terials such as arms, ammunition, aluminum, machinery and lo
comotives. Moreover, Germany was able to mitigate slightly
the effect of Allied bombing by moving some arms production
to safety beyond the Swiss frontier. Sweden was a critical trad
ing partner of Nazi Germany. Its wartime exports of ball bear
ings to Germany were vitally important, and for a time Sweden
supplied Germany with 40 percent of its iron ore until other
European sources reduced that dependency. Spain and par
ticularly Portugal provided Germany with invaluable supplies
of wolfram (tungsten) required in the steel-hardening process.
Spain also supplied iron ore, mercury, and zinc. Turkey ex
ported very scarce chrome ore to Germany, where the valuable
mineral was in short supply.^
"[T]his generation's challenge," Mr. Eizenstat says in the for
ward:
is to complete the unfinished business of the Second World War
to do justice while its surviving victims are still alive. To do jus
tice is in part a financial task. But it is also a moral and political
task that should compel each nation involved in these tragic
events to come to terms with its own history and responsibility.'
At this sjnnposium, we will examine some of the issues raised
by the Eizenstat Report. The speakers include leading scholars and
1 Id. at vi-vii.
8 Id. at xxi-xxii.
9 Id. at X.

448

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:443

key policy makers.
The first panel is entitled "The Role of Switzerland and Other
'Neutral' States During and Immediately Following World War
II." The panelists include Bennett Freeman, the Senior Advisor to
the Under Secretary. He was intimately involved in the prepara
tion of the Report from which I just quoted and is concluding work
on a second report.^" The panel also includes leading scholars from
Switzerland and the United States: Professor Fleiner from the
University of Fribourg, Professor Vagts from Harvard Law School,
Professor Schachter from Columbia Law School, and Professor
Kranzler from the City University of New York. Originally, the
Panel was also to include Professor Bergier, chairman of the com
mission appointed by Switzerland to examine the entire historical
relationship between Switzerland and Nazi Germany. Unfortu
nately, Professor Bergier was unable to come.
For the second panel, entitled "Looted Nazi Gold," we are
very pleased to have Arthur L. Smith, Jr., the author of Hitler's
Gold: The Story of the Nazi War Loot,^^ Ambassador Hedin and
Rabbi Sobel, members of the Swedish and Brazilian Commissions,
respectively, and Dr. Antonio Lou9a, author of Deals with the Na
zis: Gold and Other Lootings, 1933-45,^^ who is an expert on Nazi
gold in Portugal.
For the third panel, entitled "Hidden Swiss Bank Accounts,"
we are honored to have Paul Volcker, chairman of the Independ
ent Committee of Eminent Persons, established by Switzerland to
examine the question of dormant bank accounts. We are also very
pleased to have Roger Witten and Robert Swift, leading attorneys
representing plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, in the pending
cases involving Swiss bank accounts; Eric Wollman, from the New
York City Comptroller's Office, who will speak on the role of local
government; and Professor Anita Ramasastry, who has just com
pleted an article on the subject'^ and is continuing from here to
10 A second report was issued in June 1998. WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. AND ALLIED
WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA,
PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TURKEY ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN
EXTERNAL ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA
TREASURY: SUPPLEMENT TO PRELIMINARY STUDY ON U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO
RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY
DURING WORLD WAR II (1998).
11 ARTHUR L. SMITH, JR., HITLER'S GOLD; THE STORY OF THE NAZI WAR LOOT
(1989).
12 ANT6NIO LOUQA, NEG6CIOS COM OS NAZIS: OUROE OUTRAS PILHAGENS, 19331945 [DEALS WITH THE NAZIS: GOLD AND OTHER LOOTINGS, 1933-45] (1997).
13 Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International Human Rights,
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Switzerland to work for the Volcker Commission.
The questions raised in the Eizenstat Report and the afore
mentioned panels are not the only ones that remain unresolved or
are first coming to the fore. Although Germany has been making
monetary restitution for a number of years, the rights of those in
Eastern Europe, who until recently lived under Soviet domination,
are still unresolved. These subjects and Jewish property in France
and Norway will be discussed tomorrow on a Panel entitled "Con
fiscated Jewish Property," by Rabbi Israel Miller, president of the
Conference on Material Claims Against Germany; Ambassador
Naphtali Lavie, vice-chairman of the World Jewish Restitution
Organization; Professor Richard Weisberg of the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, author of Vichy Law and the Holocaust in
France-,^* and Professor Irwin Cotler of McGill University, a re
nowned advocate of human rights who has spent the past year re
searching in this area.
, • i.
Another question very much in the news, most recently m the
context of the Schiele paintings in the Museum of Modem Art ex
hibition, is that of "Looted Art." We are fortunate to have Hector
Feliciano, author of The Lost Museumf Michael Kurtz, author of
Nazi Contraband: American Policy on the Return of European
Cultural Treasures, 1945-1955f Lawrence Kaye, a leading attorney
in this field; and Constance Lowenthal, Director of Commission
for Art Recovery, World Jewish Congress, to discuss it.
We will also focus on two subjects that do not involve tangible
rights but raise profound moral and legal questions. Perhaps the
most complex legal and moral question involves the responsibility
of Britain after it broke the German Enigma Code. Although it
has long been known that the British broke the German Code, the
actual intercepts were only declassified in 1996. The New York
Times reported:
One transcript, for instance, from the town of Sloi^ in
Belarus, states, "In yesterday's cleansing action in Slonim by
the police regiment Mitte, 1,153 Jewish looters were shot. The
message on July 18,1941—less than a month after the German
invasion—was signed by General von dem Bach-Zelewsky, the
German commander in Belarus, and transmitted to Heinrich
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1998).
14 RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
15 HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997).
16 MICHAEL KURTZ, NAZI CONTRABAND: AMERICAN POLICY ON THE RETURN OF
EUROPEAN CULTURAL TREASURES, 1945-55 (1985).
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Himmler, the head of the SS, and Commander Daluge of the
Order Police.
In another message, dated Aug. 7, 1941, General von dem
Bach-Zelewsky wrote, with evident self-congratulation: "The
action of the SS cavalry brigade proceeds. By noon today, a
further 3,600 were executed, so that the total number by Cal
vary Regiment Eastern is 7,819. Thereby, the number of 30,000
in my area has been exceeded."
In the view of Richard Breitman, one of the historians who
got the cables declassified, the several hundred pages of radio in
tercepts, together with earlier research, establish that "the British
knew that Jews were being targeted for atrocities as early as Sep
tember 1941—more than a year before Britain or the United
States publicly acknowledged the plight of the European Jews.''^®
Did Britain have a legal or moral obligation to inform anyone of
that?
In the Corfu Channel case," Britain sued Albania for damages
because it failed to warn British warships of mines in its territorial
waters. The International Court of Justice agreed that Albania,
indeed, had a duty to warn. The coiut said:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities
consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the
existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in
warning the approaching British warships of the imminent dan
ger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are
based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is
applicable in time of war, but on certain general and wellrecognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of
humanity, e v e n m o r e exacting i n p e a c e than i n w a r . . .
Did these elementary principles of humanity also obhgate Britain
to attempt to warn the millions of Jews trapped in German occu
pied territory that the Nazis planned to exterminate them?
Britain claims that it could not do so because that would have
revealed that it had broken the Code. Indeed, even though it had
advance knowledge of a bombing, Britain permitted its own citi
zens to be killed as well in order to avoid possibly alerting Ger
many that it had the information. But the fact that Britain was
17 Alan Cowell, British Knew Early of Nazi Atrocities Against Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19,1996, at A5.
18 Id.
19 (U.K. V. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
20 Id. at 22.
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willing to sacrifice its own citizens as well is not dispositive of the
question. It demonstrates how very complex the question is.
This question will be discussed by leading historians, theologi
ans, philosophers, and legal scholars. We are privileged to have on
this panel. Professor Daniel Goldhagen of Harvard Law School,
author of Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust,Rabbi Shear-Yashuv Cohen, a renowned scholar of
Jewish law and philosophy, and Professors Kent Greenawalt and
David Sidorsky of Columbia Law School, Professor Ruth Wedg
wood of Yale Law School, and Professor Anthony D'Amato of
Northwestern—^world renowned scholars in jurisprudence, phi
losophy, and international law, respectively.
Finally, we will discuss the "Future of Auschwitz," where
some three million people, Jews and non-Jews, but predominantly
Jews, lost their lives. The enormity of the horror that took place
there is ungraspable. When I visited Auschwitz several years ago,
I foimd it very difficult just to keep walking. Jews believe it should
remain as it is, as a memorial to those who perished. Apparently,
that still has not been fully settled. First, there was an attempt to
establish a convent on the premises. When, after a great deal of
controversy, the convent was removed, there were proposals to
build a shopping mall. Those proposals have now been rejected.
The Polish government has, apparently, also agreed to remove
crosses from what is known as "the field of ashes." However, a
former SS barrack has been transformed into a church, and a very
large cross, which dominates the whole area, has been placed on
top of it.
The future of Auschwitz will be discussed by Professor Jan
Van Pelt, a professor of Architecture at the University of Water
loo and co-author of Auschwitz, 1270 to the Present,who will also
show slides of Auschwitz that will clarify the problem; Rabbi Avi
Weiss, who has been personally involved in the struggle to keep
Auschwitz as it is; Alyza Lewin, an attorney who will discuss the
international law that governs; and Dr. Frank J. Macchiarola,
President of Saint Francis College and former dean of the Benja
min N. Cardozo School of Law. We had also invited a representa
tive of the Polish government, which had planned to send a person
but informed me that it is not able to do so because its staff is oc
cupied with their foreign minister's visit to the United States.
21 DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
22 DEBORAH DWORK ET AL., AUSCHWITZ, 1270 TO THE PRESENT (1997).
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The next two days will not be easy, emotionally or intellectu
ally, but given the array of speakers they will, without doubt, be
worthwhile and will warrant your full attention.

